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1. Introduction
The recent global ﬁnancial and economic crisis and the
consequent scaling up of bankruptcy indicators call for further
reﬂection on the survival patterns of ﬁrms during a crisis period.
The literature on ﬁrm survival has shown the detrimental impact
of macroeconomic instability upon ﬁrms’ survival and their
dynamics (e.g., Audretsch & Acs, 1994; Bhattacharjee, Higson,
Holly, & Kattuman, 2009; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Varum &
Rocha, 2011, 2012). However, particular groups of ﬁrms may be
better able to surpass the difﬁculties of a crisis. In this regard, one
may ask if foreign ﬁrms exit with less or greater likelihood than
their domestic counterparts, and how does this likelihood of
exiting vary in economic downturns. This issue has been relatively
neglected in the literature, albeit the weight of foreign ﬁrms on
many host economies.
There is a rich stream of literature investigating the survival of
ﬁrms in foreign markets in comparison with domestic ﬁrms
(Bernard & Sjo¨holm, 2003; Go¨rg & Strobl, 2003a, 2003b; Kronborg
& Thomsen, 2009; Li & Guisinger, 1991; Mata & Portugal, 2002).
The overwhelming conclusion is that after controlling for
characteristics that make foreign ﬁrms different than domestic
ones, foreign ﬁrms tend to exit with greater likelihood. The most
common explanations to why foreign ﬁrms exit more often than
domestic ones rest upon the idea that in host economies foreign
ﬁrms face certain disadvantages vis-a`-vis their domestic counter-
parts, thus suffering from a ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995).
Along this line of thought, the theory of multinational enterprises
has developed upon the argument that ﬁrms operating in foreign
markets need to have some type of ownership advantages to
compensate for these increased costs of doing business abroad
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008). From another line of argumentation,
multinationals are by nature more footloose than domestic ﬁrms,
and therefore are more likely to exit (Mata & Freitas, 2012).
Both lines of argument support the view that foreign ﬁrms may
be more likely to exit markets. However, they lead to different
expectations with respect to the likelihood of exit during economic
downturns. The footloose argument implies that foreign ﬁrms
should be even more likely to exit during downturns. When
changes in the host economy make that economy less attractive,
relocation is seen more favorably by foreign ﬁrms than by domestic
ones, which are more attached to a particular location. Alterna-
tively, the liability of foreignness argument implies that the exit
rates of foreign and domestic ﬁrms should converge during
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downturns because foreign ﬁrms hold some sort of ownership
advantages over domestic ones. Foreign multinationals may have
better conditions to face the crises owing to their multinationality
advantages or they may resist more due to the sunk costs
associated with their investment (Chung, Lu, & Beamish, 2008;
Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2004; Ghosal, 2010).
Studies about the importance of foreign ownership during
crises are relatively scarce, the notable exceptions being the
studies by A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009), Lee and Makhija (2009) and
Varum and Rocha (2011). Hence, in this paper we use
longitudinal ﬁrm-level data for a large time span to assess, ﬁrst,
whether foreign ownership contributes to differentiating the
incidence of ﬁrm exit during crises, controlling for other
determinants that may affect the exit risk of ﬁrms. We use
discrete time hazard models that account for ﬁrm-level unob-
served heterogeneity to answer our research questions. In
addition, we analyze whether the foreign ownership effect
differs between two crises, which occurred in the same economy,
in different periods of time and with different characteristics. To
our knowledge the paper is unique in these respects. We analyze
manufacturing ﬁrms created in Portugal in the period 1988–2005
by following their paths during the whole period and the
economic slowdowns of early 1990s and 2000s. Portugal in
particular is an interesting case as the economy experienced
these signiﬁcant slowdowns which provide us with ‘a natural
experiment to identify directly the ‘‘footloose nature’’ of multi-
nationals’ (A´lvarez & Go¨rg, 2009).
Results from past lessons may be of value in understanding
more modern recessions, such as the one from which the world
economy is currently recovering. For the Portuguese case we add to
the previous important contributions of Mata and Portugal (2002,
2004), by enlarging the time span of their study and focusing on the
potential effect of foreign ownership during (different) downturn
periods. Compared to Varum and Rocha (2011), who examined the
link between foreign ownership, ﬁrm employment and turnover
growth and crises, the present study investigates ﬁrms’ dynamics
in terms of ﬁrm survival, using discrete time duration models. The
analysis also adds to Varum and Rocha (2012) by exploring the
foreignness effect upon ﬁrm survival under crises, differentiating
between two distinct crisis contexts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on foreign ownership–ﬁrm survival relationship. Most of
this literature does not focus on the effects during downturns, but
allows for understanding why we may expect differences between
foreign and domestic ﬁrms’ exits patterns. Section 3 relates to
methodological issues, where the data and econometric proce-
dures are outlined. Section 4 presents some descriptive statistics
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Macroeconomic conditions, foreign ownership, ﬁrm survival
and exit
The overall state of the economy has long been indicated as an
important force driving ﬁrms out of business (Geroski et al., 2010).
Current macroeconomic environment affects not only market
conditions but also market expectations about the future, leading
ﬁrms to exit if an unfavorable environment is predictable. Despite
the fact that some studies prove that exit is not responsive to the
cycle (e.g. Boeri & Bellman, 1995; Ilmakunnas & Topi, 1999), many
others found that ﬁrm exit is countercyclical and that there is a
detrimental impact of macroeconomic instability upon ﬁrms’
survival and their dynamics (Audretsch & Acs, 1994; Bhattacharjee
et al., 2009; Box, 2008; Varum & Rocha, 2012). Downturn periods
are expected to increase ﬁrms’ hazards, though eventually this
effect may be different between ﬁrms. Hence, it is important to
investigate which ﬁrm-level conditions contribute to explain why
ﬁrms resist differently during economic slowdowns.
Many studies have investigated the survival of ﬁrms in foreign
markets. The empirical results on this matter are not unanimous
(see Table 1). The overwhelming conclusion is that when
controlling for a number of variables along which foreign ﬁrms
differentiate from domestic ones, the former often exhibit higher
exit rates. This fact may be due to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer
& Mosakowski, 1997) or to the footloose nature of multinationals.
However, it remains overlooked whether under a crisis’
environment foreign ﬁrms are affected or react differently from
domestic ﬁrms and, if that is the case, whether or not their
advantages compensate for the disadvantages of doing business
abroad, possibly making them weather the crisis in a better way (or
not). From the literature, we may explore arguments for a stabilizer
or otherwise role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) during
economic downturns.
2.1. Footloose multinationals and economic downturns
Compared to their domestic counterparts, it may be easier for
foreign ﬁrms to transfer production facilities internationally
(Flamm, 1984; Lee & Makhija, 2009), to cut operational costs
(Gao & Eshaghoff, 2004) and, in the extreme, to exit the local
economy. If multinationals are indeed more ‘‘footloose’’, they may
be expected to be more likely to leave the country, especially
during that period when it is hit by a negative shock. Actually, and
relying on the way of thinking about foreign direct investment
(FDI) enriched by real option theory (Campa, 1993; Li & Rugman,
2007), foreign ﬁrms may decide to switch operations quickly
between locations in response to changing costs differentials,
market opportunities and host country uncertainty, particularly
Table 1
Empirical evidence on the foreign ownership–ﬁrm survival link.a
(A) Positive relationship (B) Negative relationship
Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) – Indonesia [1975–1985] Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) – 47 countries [1974–1993]
Li and Guisinger (1991) – USA [1978–1988] Go¨rg and Strobl (2003a, 2003b) – Ireland [1973–1996]
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) – USA [1976–1986] Bernard and Sjo¨holm (2003) – Indonesia [1975–1989]
Mata and Portugal (2004) – Portugal [1983–1989] Kimura and Kiyota (2006) – Japan [1994–2000]
Narjoko and Hill (2007) – Indonesia [1993–2000] Bernard and Jensen (2007) – USA [1987–1997]
Bridges and Guariglia (2008) – UK [1997–2002] Van Beveren (2007) – Belgium [1996–2001]
Girma and Gong (2008) – China [1999–2005] Fertala (2008) – Germany [1997–2004]
Kronborg and Thomsen (2009) – Denmark [1895–2005] A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009) – Chile [1990–2000]
Holmes, Hunt, and Stone (2010) – UK [1973–2001] Bandick and Go¨rg (2010) – Sweden [1993–2002]
(C) Neutral relationship
Mata and Portugal (2002) – Portugal [1983–1989] Kimura and Kiyota (2007) – Japan [1994–1998]
O¨zler and Taymaz (2004) – Turkey [1983–1996] Taymaz and O¨zler (2007) – Turkey [1983–2001]
a Studies are presented in a chronological order (Reference – Country [Time Period]).
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when the ‘‘growth-or-switch options’’ created when investing
abroad overlap or duplicate each other (Belderbos & Zou, 2009).
Unless sunk costs and the irreversibility of investment are
considerable – which may, in opposition, create some ‘‘hysteresis’’
and inertia in foreign ﬁrms’ strategic response to macroeconomic
changes – multinational ﬁrms tend to be more footloose than their
domestic counterparts when facing environmental uncertainty,
especially when their real investment options are redundant,
either at the host-country level or at the MNE portfolio level
(Belderbos & Zou, 2007, 2009; Ghosal, 2010; Lehmann, 2002).
Though empirical analyses on MNEs’ responses to macroeco-
nomic changes are still scant, some results already emerged. Using
plant-level data for manufacturing industries in Chile, A´lvarez and
Go¨rg (2009) examined the determinants of exit probabilities of
plants in the period 1995–2000 covering a major slowdown in the
late 1990s, paying particular attention to the role of the nationality
of the plant. They found robust evidence that foreign plants were
more likely to exit only for the late 1990s, when the Chilean
economy was in recession. They argue that this evidence is
consistent with the argument that multinationals are more likely
to readjust their investment decisions and exit if the economy is hit
by a negative shock. Hence, following this line of argumentation,
we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The probability of exit of foreign-owned ﬁrms
increases even further to those of domestic ﬁrms during economic
downturns.
2.2. Liability of foreignness and ownership advantages over economic
downturns
The liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), or the extra costs
foreign ﬁrms face vis-a`-vis their domestic counterparts in host
economies, has been at the center of the literature that found
foreign ﬁrms to exit more than domestic ones with similar
characteristics (Bernard & Sjo¨holm, 2003; Go¨rg & Strobl, 2003a,
2003b; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Even though, foreign
enterprises are said to possess ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages – of the
type described in the pioneering work of Hymer (1976) – that
compensate for the liability of foreignness, which make them able
to surpass and to outperform their domestic counterparts in the
host economy (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). These advantages may
become more valuable during economic downturns in the host
economy.
Chung et al.’s (2008) study of a sample of Japanese subsidiaries
from 1994 to 1999 indicates that the enhanced ﬂexibility
associated with intra- and inter-ﬁrm organizational linkages is
more likely to increase the performance of subsidiaries operating
in a crisis rather than in economically stable environments.
Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2005), in turn, investigated whether
foreign ownership affected investment in Indonesia in 1997
following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Despite they could not reject
somewhat higher excess mortality rates among foreign-owned
plants, they concluded that the post-crisis excess mortality of
foreign ﬁrms was lower than the differences found in the pre-crisis.
They argued that this convergence was due to the ‘multination-
ality’ advantage of foreign ﬁrms. Firms with foreign ownership, in
particular those more oriented toward export markets, could
access credit through their parent company and thus insure
themselves against liquidity constraints. Accordingly, foreign
subsidiaries in MNE networks may survive longer in a crisis
owing to their better access to resources and greater ability to use
internal capital markets when faced with ﬁnancial constraints,
being able to access overseas credit through their parent
companies, which allows them to expand their economic
activity even in turbulent periods (e.g., Desai et al., 2004). The
argumentation above predicts that during economic downturns,
the incidence of the exit of foreign ﬁrms, which in normal periods
tends to be higher, may actually get closer to that of domestic
ﬁrms. Hence, we derive the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The probability of exit of foreign owned ﬁrms
becomes closer to that of domestic ﬁrms during economic down-
turns.
In what follows we conduct the empirical analysis and derive
our conclusions of the aforementioned hypotheses.
3. Data and methodological issues
3.1. Data
In this study, we use data from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth
QP), a matched employer–employee administrative dataset from
the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. QP is an annual
mandatory employment survey that all ﬁrms in the private sector
employing at least one wage earner are legally obliged to ﬁll in.
Requested data cover the establishment (location, employment
and economic activity), the ﬁrm (location, employment, sales,
economic activity, ownership, number of establishments and legal
setting) and each of its workers (gender, age, education,
qualiﬁcations, occupational category, employment status, earn-
ings, tenure and hours of work). All ﬁrms, establishments and
workers entering QP dataset have a unique identiﬁcation number,
so we can track ﬁrms/establishments and workers over time and
match workers with their respective employers. This makes QP a
suitable dataset to study ﬁrm survival and exit.
We have access to the original data for the period 1985–2007.
By working directly with raw data ﬁles at the ﬁrm-level, it was
possible to compute entry and exit measures by ourselves. Firm’s
entry year corresponds to the ﬁrst year the ﬁrm appears in the
dataset. Therefore, we can only identify entries from 1986
onwards, as data for 1985 was only used to check the presence
of ﬁrms in the dataset. The time of exit, in turn, was determined by
the last year the ﬁrm was registered in QP. However, as temporary
exits of one year may occur (for instance, due to a ﬁrm’s delay in
delivering the survey in a particular year), we have required an
absence of the ﬁrm from QP for at least two consecutive years to
conﬁrm that the ﬁrm has deﬁnitely exited and closed operations.
Accordingly, we can identify exits only until 2005, as data for 2006
and 2007 are only used to check the records of the ﬁrm in the two
subsequent years.
Firm exit is deﬁned as the event of closing a ﬁrm. Despite the
comprehensiveness of the QP database, it has also some limita-
tions, which prevented us from distinguishing between different
exit modes – namely between voluntary exit and bankruptcy – or
even from identifying cases in which a ﬁrm is absorbed or taken
over by another ﬁrm. The same problems were already faced by
previous empirical works for Portugal (e.g. Geroski et al., 2010;
Mata & Portugal, 2002, 2004) using QP data. As a result, our
analysis is based on the timing at which a ﬁrm ceases to do
business, disappearing from QP records. Regarding possible cases
of mergers, in which an independent legal unit might disappear
without the corresponding disappearance of the ﬁrm, there is no
published data on mergers for Portugal. However, Geroski et al.
(2010) ensure that less than 1% of the total number of liquidations
in Portugal is due to mergers or acquisitions, which suggests that
our limitations in identifying exits due to mergers have no
signiﬁcant impact on our results.
The analysis is performed for ﬁrms operating in Manufacturing
Industry during the period 1988–2005. We have to restrict the
period to 1988–2005 because we only have data on the industry’s
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exports and imports (which are needed to compute industry’s
openness to trade, to be controlled in our estimations) from 1988
onwards (see Appendix A.I). We focus on the 1988 and later
cohorts, following each ﬁrm since the year of entry until its last
record in the database, which may correspond to the moment of
exit or, alternatively, to the last year we have information about
the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm has not experienced the exit during the whole
period, it is identiﬁed as a right-censored case, corresponding to
ﬁrms whose entry year is known but which are still active when
the period under study ends (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008;
Singer & Willett, 1993).
3.2. Empirical strategy and variables
We rely on duration models, which provide a dynamic
framework that addresses the inability of static binary choice
models to take into account right-censoring issues. As data on ﬁrms’
duration comes from an annual survey, our measured durations are
grouped into yearly time intervals, which are properly accommo-
dated by discrete time duration models (Singer & Willett, 1993). We
thus proceed by dividing the time axis (1988–2005) into 18
intervals, corresponding to our 18 measured durations.
Formally, we observe ﬁrm i’s spell from period j = 1 (corre-
sponding to the year of entry) through to the end of the jth period,
at which point i’s spell is either complete ci = 1 or right-censored
ci = 0 (ﬂow sample). To estimate the discrete interval hazard rate –
that is, the probability of exiting at discrete time tj, j = 1, 2, . . .,
conditional upon having survived until then – can be deﬁned as:
hi j ¼ PrðTi ¼ jjTi  jÞ ¼ FðgðtÞ þ X0iðtÞb þ eiÞ; (1)
where hij is the probability of ﬁrm i remaining active for exactly j
years; g(t) describes the pattern of duration dependence (the
baseline hazard); X0iðtÞ is a vector of ﬁrm and industry-level
variables which, from the literature, and similarly to Varum and
Rocha (2012), are expected to impact on ﬁrm survival (see
Appendix A.I for details on these variables); b is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated; ei is a disturbance term that
includes the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc effect) and that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
observable ﬁrm and industry characteristics X0iðtÞ; and ﬁnally F()
denotes the complementary log-logistic distribution function.
Following prior studies on ﬁrm survival using QP (Mata &
Portugal, 2002; Varum & Rocha, 2012), we do not impose any
functional form for g(t); we instead estimate a piecewise constant
hazard model, where exit rates are assumed to be constant within
each interval (year) but different between intervals (years). Thus,
in order to estimate the full set of g’s, we have added an indicator
variable per duration time t to the model. This ﬂexible modeling
has been recognized to be preferred in order to avoid serious
misspeciﬁcations. Moreover, such hazard formulation with a
ﬂexible baseline hazard function makes an attractive model with
which to combine a speciﬁc heterogeneity assumption (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2005: 620). Accordingly, following usual conventions (e.g.,
Hougaard, 1995; Jenkins, 2005), we assume an Inverse Gaussian
distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity term, so that ei is
normally distributed with zero mean and unitary variance.
Summing up, the discrete time hazard function in (1), to be
estimated under a complementary log-logistic model with Inverse
Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity, may be rewritten as follows:
hi j ¼ 1  expfexp½gðtÞ þ X0iðtÞb þ logðeiÞg: (2)
The variable Foreign Ownership – one of the core variables included
in the vector X0iðtÞ – will allow us to assess the effect of foreign
capital participation in ﬁrms’ exit patterns. As our main goal is to
assess whether foreign-owned ﬁrms have different failure rates
than domestic ﬁrms during downturns, and if that effect differs
depending on the type of crises, we focus our attention on an
interaction term between Foreign Ownership and two indicator
variables for the periods of economic downturn (For. Own*-
Downturni, with i = 1991–1994, 2001–2003).
Regarding other ﬁrm and industry-level variables that are
believed to affect ﬁrm survival, we follow the existent empirical
literature on ﬁrm survival determinants (see, for instance, Manjo´n-
Antolı´n and Arauzo-Carod (2008) for a survey). At the ﬁrm-level,
we control for ﬁrm age (see Jovanovic, 1982; Stinchcombe, 1965,
among others), ﬁrm size (measured by the log number of
employees) (e.g., Varum & Rocha, 2012), human capital (proxied
by the share of college workers) (e.g., Acs & Armington, 2009;
Bates, 1990), ﬁrm performance (sales per worker, in logs) (e.g.,
Bandick, 2010; Carreira & Teixeira, 2011) and location in urban
centers (e.g., Fotopoulos & Louri, 2000). The effects of ﬁrm age and
size are allowed to be non-linear in line with most of the literature,
as these variables may exert an increasing (decreasing) effect on
ﬁrm exit risks up to some point of ﬁrm age or size, while exerting a
decreasing (increasing) effect thereafter.
Concerning the industry environment, we will control for
potential differences in the industry context. We will consider the
minimum efﬁcient scale – calculated as the median of 2-digit
industry’s employment – as one of the reasons why so many ﬁrms
fail is that their entry size is smaller than the minimum scale
required to be efﬁcient (Audretsch, 1995). By including industry
openness (measured by the ratio of 2-digit industry’s (export-
s + imports) to industry’s gross value added), we try to take the
industry’s exposure to international conditions into account. We
will control for market concentration through the Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman (HH) Index, which may either raise the risk of failure
through greater competition intensity or decrease the exit rates by
offering the incumbents enough power to retaliate against
entrants. Industry growth (in terms of employment) will also be
controlled for, as average proﬁts are affected by growth rates of
industries, so industries growing quickly may exert positive
impacts upon survival. Entry rates may also be associated with
ﬁrm survival, as ﬁrms tend to enter the industries where higher
proﬁts are expected. Agglomeration economies at the industry and
regional-levels, as well as foreign presence in the industry, will also
be taken into account, as they are commonly controlled for in
comparative studies of domestic and foreign ﬁrms (see Table A.I for
additional details on the computation of these variables).
Regarding foreign presence, this variable is commonly introduced
in ﬁrm survival studies, not only to try to capture horizontal
spillovers from multinationals to other ﬁrms in the industry
(A´lvarez & Go¨rg, 2009), but also in order to account for some
unobserved characteristics of the industries, such as advertising
and technological intensity (Mata & Portugal, 2002), which may be
related to the previous presence of foreign ﬁrms in the market.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and unconditional survival analysis
4.1.1. Survival and hazard rates
Over the time period under scrutiny, it was possible to identify
two downturn periods in the Portuguese economy: the early 1990s
(1991–1994) and the early 2000s (2001–2003) (Bank of Portugal,
2009). Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate, respectively, the evolution of real
GDP growth rates and unemployment rates over the period under
study, both for Portugal and for the Euro area. In these periods, the
common stylized facts for a downturn period were observed – both
periods were characterized by declines in GDP growth rates, in
private consumption and investment and by a rise in unemploy-
ment. However, the early 2000s recession was different from that
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occurred in 1993/1994, when foreign demand for goods fell 3.2%,
which culminated into a period of several years in which there was
a gradual slowing of this variable. According to the Bank of Portugal
(2004), the reduction of the product in 2003 was not associated
with a fall in exports of goods and services. Hence, for the purpose
of our analysis we consider the second crisis to be predominantly
domestic driven.
After identifying entry and exits of ﬁrms in Manufacturing, we
obtained a discrete time panel data set composed by 87,027 ﬁrms
‘‘born’’ during the period 1988–2005. From these, 55,622 exits
were identiﬁed. As a ﬁrst step of our survival analysis, we have
estimated the survivor function of ﬁrms, without controlling for
any observed and unobserved differences between them. Using
Kaplan–Meier (KM) estimator (Kalbﬂeisch & Prentice, 1980), the
unconditional probability of a ﬁrm surviving beyond time t is
computed as follows:
Sˆðt jÞ ¼
Yt
j¼t0
1  dj
n j
 
; (3)
where dj is the number of exits in each time interval and nj is the
number of ﬁrms at risk of exit. Precise estimations for the survivor
and hazard functions for all ﬁrms are presented in Table 2.
Only 15.57% of the ﬁrms remained active after 18 years.
The results also conﬁrm the high exit rate of young ﬁrms. Indeed,
the risk of exit tends to be higher during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of
activity – which corresponds to the estimated median survival
time – being slightly lower thereafter. In particular, data show that
more than 50% of ﬁrms ceased their operations during the ﬁrst ﬁve
years and almost 70% of ﬁrms exited before completing a decade of
activity.
Fig. 3 depicts the KM survivor functions for different categories
of ﬁrms, stratiﬁed according to their foreign ownership status
(Domestic Firm if less than 10% of the capital is held by foreigners,
Minority Foreign Firm (FF) if the share of foreign capital is between
10% and 49%, Majority FF if this share is between 50% and 99% and,
ﬁnally, Wholly-Owned FF for the cases in which 100% of the capital
is foreign). Table 3 compares the unconditional survival rates
between small and large ﬁrms within the samples of foreign and
domestic ﬁrms. Firms are stratiﬁed into small and medium-sized
or large-sized ﬁrms through an indicator variable Small that
assumes the value 1 if the ﬁrm is a SME (Small–Medium
Enterprise). This classiﬁcation is made according to the European
deﬁnition of SMEs (European Commission, 2005).
Unconditionally, foreign-owned ﬁrms survive longer than their
domestic counterparts and, moreover, wholly foreign-owned ﬁrms
seem to have the highest survival rates. Median survival time is
lower for domestic ﬁrms (about four to ﬁve years against 10–12
years for foreign ﬁrms). The Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests conﬁrm
that differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Taking
in consideration ﬁrm size, the differences in survival chances seem
not to be relevant among foreign ﬁrms. Conversely, large domestic
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Fig. 1. Annual growth rate of real GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
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Fig. 2. Unemployment rate.
Table 2
Survival and hazard rates – all ﬁrms in Portuguese manufacturing industry, 1988–2005.
Time interval Nr. ﬁrms at risk Nr. failures Net Losta Survival Std. error Hazard Std. error Cumulative failure
[1–2[ 87,027 16,890 3350 0.8059 0.0013 0.1941 0.0015 0.1941
[2–3[ 66,787 9631 2820 0.6897 0.0016 0.1442 0.0015 0.3103
[3–4[ 54,336 7058 3145 0.6001 0.0017 0.1299 0.0015 0.3999
[4–5[ 44,133 5328 3381 0.5277 0.0018 0.1207 0.0017 0.4723
[5–6[ 35,424 3953 3466 0.4688 0.0018 0.1116 0.0018 0.5312
[6–7[ 28,005 2872 1975 0.4207 0.0018 0.1026 0.0019 0.5793
[7–8[ 23,158 2277 1544 0.3793 0.0018 0.0983 0.0021 0.6207
[8–9[ 19,337 1704 1335 0.3459 0.0018 0.0881 0.0021 0.6541
[9–10[ 16,298 1387 1290 0.3165 0.0019 0.0851 0.0023 0.6835
[10–11[ 13,621 1125 1060 0.2903 0.0019 0.0826 0.0025 0.7097
[11–12[ 11,436 929 1273 0.2668 0.0019 0.0812 0.0027 0.7332
[12–13[ 9234 787 1491 0.2440 0.0019 0.0852 0.0030 0.7560
[13–14[ 6956 547 896 0.2248 0.0019 0.0786 0.0034 0.7752
[14–15[ 5513 447 854 0.2066 0.0019 0.0811 0.0038 0.7934
[15–16[ 4212 303 950 0.1917 0.0020 0.0719 0.0041 0.8083
[16–17[ 2959 181 855 0.1800 0.0020 0.0612 0.0045 0.8200
[17–18[ 1923 150 914 0.1660 0.0022 0.0780 0.0064 0.8340
[18–19[ 859 53 806 0.1557 0.0025 0.0617 0.0085 0.8443
a ‘‘Net Lost’’ gives the number of censored cases, and hence the cases no longer entering the risk set.
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ﬁrms seem to have substantially better chances of survival. In
opposition, small domestic ﬁrms are more exposed to risk of exit
during their infancy, with almost 40% of these ﬁrms closing down
operations before the third year of activity, and less than 50%
reaching the ﬁfth year.
4.1.2. Describing foreign and domestic ﬁrms
Table 4 provides a brief comparison between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms, presenting the mean values of the main independent
variables included in our estimations. Overall, we observe that
ﬁrms with foreign participation are larger, more intensive in
human capital, with higher levels of operational performance,
being also more concentrated in urban centers, when compared to
domestic ﬁrms.
Regarding the industries entered, our results conﬁrm expected
differences between foreign and domestic entrants. Foreign
entrants prefer industries where concentration is higher, where
minimum efﬁcient scale is larger, with stronger foreign presence
and greater openness to external trade. Regarding the industry
growth rate, the entry rates in the industry and the agglomeration
in the region where ﬁrms are located, the differences were not so
evident. However, the overall results suggest that, due to their
intrinsic advantages, foreign entrants are usually in a better
position to overcome the obstacles posed by entry barriers. A
correlation matrix for the main variables included in the
estimations can be found in Appendix A.II.
4.2. Estimation results
4.2.1. The foreign ownership effect
Table 5 provides our ﬁrst results on the effect of foreign
ownership measured by the share of ﬁrm capital held by foreign
investors. Table A.III presents a summary of the results obtained
Log-Rank  Test χ2(3) = 228.53** *  Wilcoxon Test χ2(3) = 207.41***        
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Fig. 3. K–M survivor function, by foreign ownership.
Table 3
Survival rates for domestic and foreign SMEs and LEs (Portugal, 1988–2005).
Survival time Domestic Firms Minority FF Majority FF Wholly-Owned FF
SMEs LEs SMEs LEs SMEs LEs SMEs LEs
1 0.8059 0.7957 0.9459 1.0000 0.9034 1.0000 0.9127 0.8966
3 0.6001 0.7162 0.8188 0.7500 0.7359 0.9167 0.7927 0.7890
5 0.4686 0.6479 0.7294 0.7500 0.6371 0.8148 0.6950 0.6216
7 0.3790 0.5822 0.6202 0.7500 0.5774 0.6984 0.6245 0.6216
9 0.3160 0.5433 0.5770 0.7500 0.5230 0.6984 0.5498 0.4895
11 0.2661 0.4939 0.5339 0.7500 0.4794 0.5587 0.4980 0.4196
13 0.2240 0.4939 0.4905 . 0.4349 0.5587 0.4481 0.4196
15 0.1909 0.4233 0.4088 . 0.3947 . 0.4252 0.4196
17 0.1652 0.4233 0.3577 . 0.3464 . 0.3753 0.4196
Log-Rank Test x2(1) 13.46*** 0.10 1.21 0.08
Wilcoxon Test x2(1) 5.93** 0.05 1.74 0.12
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises; LEs: Large Enterprises.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics (mean values) – Portugal, 1988–2005.
Domestic Firms Minority FF Majority FF Wholly-Owned FF
For. Ownership 0.0000 0.2969 0.7264 1.0000
FF_Minoritya 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
FF_Majoritya 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
FF_Wholly Owneda 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Age 4.7777 5.8604 5.5523 5.9005
Size 1.6476 3.2959 3.2432 3.6857
Firm Performance 10.1401 11.0170 11.2076 11.2745
Human Capital 0.0174 0.1054 0.0995 0.1169
Urbana 0.3680 0.4593 0.4225 0.4891
MES 6.5954 6.8858 7.0600 6.9880
HH Index 0.0024 0.0039 0.0035 0.0034
Industry Agglomeration 0.1857 0.1584 0.1763 0.1881
Regional Agglomeration 0.0743 0.0810 0.0750 0.0774
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.1088 0.1344 0.1390 0.1524
Industry Openness 1.9627 2.1910 2.2775 2.5533
Industry Growth 0.0058 0.0133 0.0116 0.0098
Entry Rate 0.0586 0.0549 0.0560 0.0551
a Indicator variable.
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from the estimation of an alternative speciﬁcation of the global
model, after replacing the Foreign Ownership variable by three
indicator variables for each type of Foreign Firms (FF): Minority,
Majority or Wholly Foreign-Owned ﬁrm.
Model 1 in Table 5 shows the effect of foreign ownership on the
risk of failure, without controlling for any other ﬁrm-level or
industry-level characteristics. The results of these ﬁrst estimations
are in line with those obtained from previous ﬁrm survivor
functions (Fig. 3) – unconditionally, foreign ownership decreases
ﬁrm exit risk. When we consider foreign ownership measured by
the three indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-
Owned FF, we ﬁnd that, without controlling for any other
observable characteristics, all the three groups of ﬁrms have
about 29–36% lower rates of hazard than domestic ﬁrms (by taking
the exponents of the coefﬁcients of model 1, in Table A.III). For the
period 1983–1989, Mata and Portugal (2002) had found as well
that, unconditionally, FF were 51% less prone to exit than domestic
ﬁrms. However, the magnitude of the coefﬁcients is not directly
comparable because the periods of analysis are signiﬁcantly
different.
Model 2 adds to the Foreign Ownership variable the other ﬁrm-
level characteristics. Model 3 controls for industries’ speciﬁcities.
Model 4 introduces the macroeconomic control, by adding the two
indicator variables for downturn periods. From these results, we
conclude that when controlling for other ﬁrm and industry
characteristics, and also macroeconomic conditions, the effect of
foreign ownership turns out to be positively and signiﬁcantly
related to ﬁrm hazard. This means that, overall, during normal/
average conditions, foreign ﬁrms have higher exit rates than their
domestic counterparts. Results in Table A.III show that this is true
particularly for the groups of Majority FF, though the differences
are rarely statistically signiﬁcant.
The inclusion of indicator variables for downturn periods in
model 4 also allows us to verify that ﬁrm exit is countercyclical,
increasing during recessive periods. Moreover, the effect of the ﬁrst
downturn (1991–1994) was greater in magnitude, suggesting that
the international crisis had a larger negative effect on overall ﬁrm
survival, when compared to the second domestic shock. Taking the
exponents of both coefﬁcients, we see that ﬁrms’ hazard increased
on average by 27% during the ﬁrst downturn period and by nearly
10% in the second.
With model 5, we are able to answer our central research
question about the effect of foreign ownership during periods of
economic slowdown. It were included the terms For.Own.*Down-
turn9194 and For.Own.*Downturn0103 in the estimation of the
global model. Our results show that foreign ﬁrms suffered
comparatively higher exit risks, but only when the crisis added
also an international dimension. For the downturn of 1991–1994,
we verify that foreign ownership increases ﬁrm exit risks even
more. Results from Table A.III show that Majority FF were
particularly more exposed to failure during the ﬁrst downturn
period, presenting about 57% (exp(0.4535) = 1.5738) higher hazard
rates than domestic ﬁrms. Hence, the differences that already
existed between both sets of ﬁrms were intensiﬁed during the ﬁrst
downturn.
Regarding the second downturn period, the coefﬁcient of
For.Own.*Downturn0103 is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant.
The higher hazard rates observed during normal periods for foreign
ﬁrms vanished during the 2001–2003 crisis. Hence, compared to
foreign ﬁrms, domestic ﬁrms were more penalized by this second
downturn. Foreign-owned ﬁrms might have resisted slightly better
to that shock, possibly owing to their internal resources, networks
or to the capacity to explore the international market.
Hence, overall, foreign ﬁrms may act as stabilizer agents during
downturns driven by a domestic shock, if this is not accompanied
by declines in international demand. A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009)
found foreign ﬁrms to have higher risk rates than domestic ones
during an economic downturn, but also concluded that export-
oriented multinationals were less susceptible to adverse changes
in the host economy as compared to domestic market oriented
multinationals. The former may have substituted exports for
domestic output and hence were able to fend off negative effects
and able to sustain their operations in Chile.
Therefore, the extent to which the foreignness effect matters to
explain exit may, on the one hand, depend on the type of crises. If
the crisis is more related to a domestic demand contraction, foreign
ﬁrms may indeed overcome better the downturn. Being normally
larger than domestic ﬁrms and often less reliant on the domestic
market, they may switch their sales from host countries to export
markets (Lipsey, 2001), and may be better able to face the adverse
economic conditions. On the other hand, the type of FDI may also
play a role, as horizontally- and vertically-integrated foreign ﬁrms
may react differently to a shock in the host economy. While the
former – by often replicating an identical production process
across countries and thus sharing a substituting relationship with
the parent multinational ﬁrm (e.g., Yeaple, 2003) – are expected to
be more volatile and shift production back home when facing
demand contractions in the host country, vertically-integrated
foreign ﬁrms may, instead, be more resilient during a crisis, owing
to the stabilizing role of vertical production linkages and to the
complementarities established with home country production
(Alfaro & Chen, 2012; Bogach & Noy, 2012). Unfortunately, our data
do not allow the distinction between horizontally- and vertically-
integrated foreign ﬁrms, so future research should explore
whether and how the type of FDI acts as a relevant channel
through which foreign ownership can affect ﬁrm behavior during a
crisis.
4.2.2. Firm and industry-level determinants of ﬁrm survival
Regarding the effect of other variables on ﬁrm survival, we
observe that ﬁrm-level variables, are all statistically signiﬁcant.
Firm age, though weakly, exerts an inverted U-shaped effect upon
exit rates; estimated coefﬁcients suggest that ﬁrm hazards
increase during the ﬁrst eight years of ﬁrm life and start to
decrease thereafter. Firm size, in turn, has a U-shaped effect on ﬁrm
hazards; ﬁrms employing about 200 workers are estimated to have
the lowest exit risks on average, while very small and very large
ﬁrms face the greatest hazards. Firm performance is found to be
negatively related to ﬁrm hazard.
Contrary to our expectations, human capital increases the ﬁrms’
exit risk. Though surprising, such an outcome may have a
reasonable explanation and similar conclusions have already been
obtained by other studies for Portugal using QP database. Teixeira
and Vieira (2005), based on data relative to 28 NUTs and 275
Portuguese municipalities between 1990 and1999, found that
human capital intensive regions were those that, on average, had
higher rates of ﬁrm failure. According to their study, hiring top
educated workers may increase ﬁrm failure risk, at least in the
medium-long run, since these workers tend to absorb ﬁrm total
industry speciﬁc knowledge quicker than their less educated
counterparts, and therefore require higher wage levels, otherwise
they exit to rival ﬁrms, which may make the ﬁrm unproﬁtable. For
USA, Acs and Armington (2009) also found puzzling results on the
link between human capital and ﬁrm survival and did not discard
the hypothesis that higher shares of college degrees lead to higher
rates of failure among new ﬁrms, especially during recessions.
Actually, better educated workers may require higher wages,
which leads to increasing costs for ﬁrms. More recently, Campbell,
Ganco, Franco, and Agarwal (2012) stress that employees with
higher earnings (which are positively related with their education)
are less likely to leave the ﬁrm relative to employees with lower
earnings, but if they leave, they are more likely to create a new
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venture than join another ﬁrm, which may be harmful for the
source ﬁrm.
Regardingtheinﬂuenceof location,beinglocatedinurbancenters
is found to increase the risk of failure, so despite the wealth of diverse
resources often found in urban areas, the intensity of competition or
diseconomies of agglomeration lowers the survival prospects of
ﬁrms. With respect to the effect of industry variables, higher entry
rates and higher openness to trade increase the risk of exit. Higher
minimumefﬁcientscaleoftheindustryinsteadreducesﬁrmhazards.
The larger the industry growth, the lower are the estimated hazard
risks for ﬁrms. Firms operating in more agglomerated regions (in
terms of employment) face higher exit risks. The effect arising from
foreign presence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, we must be aware that some of these variables may
be endogeneous, being jointly determined with ﬁrm hazard rates
and correlated with the error term. According to prior literature,
ﬁrm size and ﬁrm performance are the main regressors potentially
suffering from endogeneity problems (see, for instance, Blanchard,
Dhyne, Fuss, & Mathieu, 2012). In other words, there may be
unobservable factors that affect ﬁrm hazard rates and that also
impact on these variables. Demand shocks or a great idea for a new
product are only some of the unobservable factors that may affect
not only ﬁrm exit but also ﬁrm size and performance. In addition,
the shadow of death phenomenon (e.g., Griliches & Regev, 1995)
may also play a role, as ﬁrm productivity or size tend to decline
prior to exit, so these variables may be endogeneous with respect
Table 5
The effect of foreign ownership (share of foreign capital in the ﬁrm).a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
For. Ownership 0.4671*** 0.1242** 0.1338** 0.1358** 0.1217
(0.0947) (0.0621) (0.0614) (0.0626) (0.0798)
Age 0.2902 0.3143* 0.3220* 0.3218*
(0.1842) (0.1841) (0.1843) (0.1843)
Age2/100 1.7375* 1.9009* 1.9067* 1.9065*
(1.0076) (1.0072) (1.0081) (1.0081)
Size 0.6136*** 0.6002*** 0.6163*** 0.6162***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Size2 0.0582*** 0.0570*** 0.0582*** 0.0582***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Firm Performance 0.0112** 0.0112** 0.0124** 0.0122**
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Human Capital 0.3210*** 0.2884*** 0.2814*** 0.2845***
(0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0508) (0.0507)
Urban 0.1748*** 0.1400*** 0.1399*** 0.1400***
(0.0110) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0153)
MES 0.0436*** 0.0640*** 0.0640***
(0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0073)
HH Index 6.1368 5.1442 5.0165
(3.8362) (3.9173) (3.9195)
Industry Agglomeration 0.4552 0.7698** 0.7651**
(0.3796) (0.3862) (0.3863)
Regional Agglomeration 0.6015*** 0.6386*** 0.6374***
(0.1602) (0.1650) (0.1650)
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.7578** 0.2064 0.2012
(0.3334) (0.3354) (0.3355)
Industry Openness 0.0404*** 0.0713*** 0.0715***
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Industry Growth 0.2148*** 0.1075** 0.1070**
(0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0419)
Entry Rate 5.1561*** 3.5316*** 3.5213***
(0.3691) (0.3974) (0.3974)
Downturn9194 0.2377*** 0.2356***
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Downturn0103 0.0916*** 0.0929***
(0.0127) (0.0128)
For. Own.*Downturn9194 0.2949**
(0.1485)
For. Own.*Downturn0103 0.1694
(0.1437)
Constant 3.4715*** 1.4196*** 1.4425*** 1.2875*** 1.3179***
(0.0712) (0.1835) (0.1903) (0.1916) (0.1915)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145
Log Likelihood 160,514.94 129,281.64 127,492.04 127,394.48 127,391.07
x2 1035.07*** 10,622.81*** 11,332.53*** 10,996.99*** 11,002.87***
su 2.7656 0.4241 0.3577 0.4505 0.4503
r 0.8230 0.0986 0.0722 0.1098 0.1097
x2(r) 373.58*** 35.59*** 18.76*** 39.00*** 39.00***
To interpret the above results in terms of odds ratios, we must take the exponent of estimated coefﬁcients. r measures the proportion of total unexplained variance that is
contributed by individual speciﬁc effects; su corresponds to the standard deviation of the heterogeneity variance; x
2(r) is the Chi-squared test for the signiﬁcance of
unobserved heterogeneity.
a Complementary log-logistic model with piece-wise constant hazard rates and Inverse Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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to the exit decision. Accordingly, robustness checks taking into
account the potential endogeneity of these regressors must be
performed.
4.2.3. Endogeneity issues and robustness checks
According to the literature, there is neither a standard
Instrumental-Variable (IV) estimation in the context of hazard
models, nor a test of instrument validity under non-linear hazard
estimation (Bandick & Go¨rg, 2010; Bascle, 2008; Wang, 2013).
Consequently, results are reliable under the assumption of
instrument validity, which, so far, cannot be tested in this type
of models. Even so, the use of lagged values of endogeneous
covariates as instruments is a common – and less compromising –
practice (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2012; Girma & Gong, 2008; Haskel,
Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007; Wang, 2013), thus offering a
satisfactory alternative when the suitability of instruments is
not testable.
Concerning the way to introduce IV in non-linear regressions as
discrete time hazard models, this seems to be an issue still under
development, particularly when the potentially endogeneous
regressors are continuous (instead of binary/choice variables).
Prior procedures found in similar literature typically follow one of
the two most common practices: either (1) use the lagged terms of
the endogeneous variables instead of their current values,
assuming that contemporaneous values are affected by their lags,
while these lagged terms do not correlate (or are, at least, much
less correlated) with the error term (e.g., Wang, 2013); or (2) follow
the typical IV methods adopted in linear models, by regressing the
endogeneous variable(s) on a set of exogeneous variables – that
include the exogeneous variables from the main model and
additional instruments (typically, the lagged value(s) of the
endogeneous variable(s)), and then introducing the ﬁtted value
of the endogeneous variable(s) from this ﬁrst-step regression(s) in
the original model (e.g., Bandick & Go¨rg, 2010; Blanchard et al.,
2012).2
Due to the identiﬁed limitations, we analyze the endogeneity of
ﬁrm size and performance in an exploratory manner, using the two
aforementioned alternatives. However, unfortunately, when using
IV approach, there seems to be no formal test to choose between
the standard and the IV estimation in the context of survival
models (Wang, 2013). Thus, we provide the results obtained from
IV approach as a robustness test, just to compare with the baseline
results (model 5 from Table 5).3
We report the results from our robustness tests in Table 6. In the
ﬁrst column we report the results for model 5, after replacing the
variables Size and Firm Performance by their lagged values. This
approach, though simpler, allows attenuating simultaneity bias. In
the second column, we follow the typical IV method and replace
both variables by their ﬁtted value, obtained from the ﬁrst stage
estimation (whose results are reported in Table A.IV).
Results on most of the ﬁrm and industry-level covariates
remain qualitatively unchanged when correcting – or at least
moderating – potential problems caused by endogenous regres-
sors. However, some new results emerge. After taking into account
that ﬁrm size and performance are endogeneous and correlated
with the error term, ﬁrm-level unobserved heterogeneity is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. Also, the U-shaped effect of ﬁrm size
on hazards now reaches its inﬂexion point between 145 (according
to IV estimation) and 152 employees (when using lagged valued
Table 6
Robustness checks to the endogeneity of some regressors.a
1-Year lag IV estimation
For. Ownership 0.0507 0.0918
(0.0848) (0.0886)
Age 0.3232 0.3663*
(0.2027) (0.2080)
Age2/100 1.8601* 2.0917*
(1.0511) (1.0787)
Size (§) 0.4975*** 0.5294***
(0.0134) (0.0162)
Size2 (§) 0.0495*** 0.0532***
(0.0033) (0.0037)
Firm Performance (§) 0.0532*** 0.1032***
(0.0059) (0.0090)
Human Capital 0.4367*** 0.5268***
(0.0580) (0.0606)
Urban 0.1295*** 0.1176***
(0.0160) (0.0166)
MES 0.0693*** 0.0643***
(0.0088) (0.0091)
HH Index 7.5871 7.9842
(4.7295) (4.8240)
Industry Agglomeration 0.0906 0.0800
(0.4336) (0.4475)
Regional Agglomeration 0.6986*** 0.8354***
(0.1774) (0.1822)
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.2414 0.4586
(0.3874) (0.3974)
Industry Openness 0.0704*** 0.0728***
(0.0151) (0.0156)
Industry Growth 0.1849*** 0.1772***
(0.0480) (0.0494)
Entry Rate 3.9121*** 4.1918***
(0.4677) (0.4793)
Downturn9194 0.1631*** 0.1427***
(0.0228) (0.0236)
Downturn0103 0.1866*** 0.1845***
(0.0143) (0.0147)
For. Own*Downturn9194 0.4810*** 0.4800***
(0.1644) (0.1700)
For. Own*Downturn0103 0.1993 0.1267
(0.1596) (0.1621)
Constant 1.4890*** 1.0296***
(0.3747) (0.3916)
Industry Dummies YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES
N 284,049 284,049
Log Likelihood 99,136.40 94,970.37
x2 7531.14 7157.55
su 0.0824 0.1084
r 0.0041 0.0071
x2(r) 0.01 0.12
Hausman test (p-value) – 0.000
a We extend model 5 of Table 5 to attenuate the simultaneity bias caused by
some potential endogeneous regressors – explanatory variables with ‘‘(§)’’ in this
table. In the ﬁrst column, we replace each of the covariates with ‘‘(§)’’ by their
lagged value (1-year lag). In the second column, we use instrumental variables
estimation and replace those variables by the ﬁtted value of each variable obtained
from the ﬁrst step equations. The results of the ﬁrst stage are presented in Table
A.IV.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
2 A less conventional approach is also explored by Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas
(2007) and Blanchard et al. (2012). They include the residual from the ﬁrst step
estimation in the original model and test the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of that
residual. If the corresponding coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant, this may be a
sign of signiﬁcant endogeneity problems, conﬁrming that the endogeneous
variables should be instrumented. We have also followed this exploratory
approach, which conﬁrmed that this was the case for both variables under analysis
– ﬁrm size and ﬁrm performance. The results from those additional estimations are
available upon request from the authors.
3 Bandick and Go¨rg (2010) also recognize that, hitherto, there is no formal
method to choose between the two models. Even so, they suggest that the results
from a standard Hausman test would be a rough indicator of whether or not the
assumption of exogeneity holds. We follow their approach and compare the
baseline model (model 5) with the results from IV estimation (column 2 in Table 6).
The test, reported at the bottom of Table 6, suggests that the exogeneity assumption
can be rejected. In addition, the log-likelihood is higher in IV estimation. Overall, the
results suggest that IV estimation results might be preferable to the baseline results.
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for the endogeneous variables), a much lower threshold than those
indicated by the baseline results (about 200 employees). For the
remaining variables, the correction of endogeneity did not
substantially change the conclusions, though the magnitude of
some effects slightly changes. The previous conclusions on the
effect of foreign ownership during crises – which are the main
focus of the study – remain qualitatively the same after controlling
for the endogeneity of ﬁrm size and ﬁrm performance.4
Despite this analysis is still exploratory, it shows that ignoring the
endogeneity of some ﬁrm-level variables may produce biased
estimations. However, most of the literature addressing issues
related with ﬁrm survival has been overlooking that some of the
ﬁrm-level characteristics predicting exit are in fact endogeneous and
jointly determined with exit decision. In view of that, further
research is needed, not only regarding the effect of some
(endogeneous) variables on ﬁrm survival, and moreover regarding
the way to deal with such endogeneous covariates in duration
models.
5. Conclusion
By using a unique data set with ﬁrm- and industry-level
information for Portugal, this paper examines the link between
foreign ownership and ﬁrm exit in Portuguese manufacturing
industry over an 18-year period and during two periods of
economic slowdown in particular. We investigated two main
questions: if foreign afﬁliates have different failure rates than
domestic ﬁrms during economic downturns and if the foreignness
effect differs between two different economic downturns.
First, the results highlight the importance of taking ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity into account when analyzing the survival patterns of
ﬁrms. Unconditionally, foreign ﬁrms survive longer than their
domestic counterparts. However, when controlling for other
variables, the share of capital held by foreign investors is found
to increase ﬁrms’ hazard rates. During the downturn periods
observed in the Portuguese economy, both groups of ﬁrms were
severely affected, suffering higher risks of failure. Nevertheless,
while in the ﬁrst crisis foreign ﬁrms were markedly more affected,
partially supporting the footloose argument (Hypothesis 1), in the
second downturn period, the overall differences in hazard rates
between domestic and foreign ﬁrms were attenuated, partially
supporting Hypothesis 2.
This is the ﬁrst study that systematically evaluates the foreign
ownership effect upon exit during such a long time period and
covering two different economic downturns. Further studies are
needed also in other economies. A careful investigation of the
causes behind the observed differences – taking into account, for
instance, the type of FDI and MNEs’ motivations – seems to be in
order for a deepening of our understanding on the prospects of
survival in international markets during crisis.
For the policy-maker concerned with FDI, our results on
survival dynamics are not against policies stimulating inward
investment. According to our results, there is no need to fear that
foreign ﬁrms destabilize more than usual the host economy during
economic slowdowns by immediately closing down operations.
Appendix
Table A.I
Description of variables.
Variables Description
Main variables of interest
For. Ownership Share of capital held by foreign investors in time t.
FF_Minority Dummy = 1 if 10%  share of capital held in t by foreign investors < 50%; 0 otherwise.
FF_Majority Dummy = 1 if 50%  share of capital held in t by foreign investors < 100%; 0 otherwise.
FF_Wholly Owned Dummy = 1 if 100% of the capital is held in t by foreign investors; 0 otherwise.
Downturn9194 Dummy = 1 for the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994; 0 otherwise.
Downturn0103 Dummy = 1 for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003; 0 otherwise.
For. Own*Downturni Interaction term between foreign ownership and the dummy for the downturn i (i = 1991–1994; 2001–2003).
FF_Minority*Downturni Interaction term between FF_Minority dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
FF_Majority*Downturni Interaction term between FF_Majority dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
FF_Wholly Owned *Downturni Interaction term between FF_Wholly Owned dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
Firm-level controls
Age Number of years since the entry of the ﬁrm.
Age2/100 Squared number of years since the entry of the ﬁrm, divided by 100.
Size Ln(number of employees), by year.
Size2 Squared value of Ln(number of employees), by year.
Firm Performance Operational Performance measured through the log of the ratio Firm Salesa/Firm Employment, by year.
Human Capital Share of workers with a college degree, by year.
Urban Dummy = 1 if the ﬁrm operates in large urban areas (i.e., in the districts of Porto or Lisbon); 0 otherwise.
Environment controls (industry and regional context)
MES Median of 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
HH Index Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index – sum of the squared share of each ﬁrm in total 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
Industry Agglomeration Share of 2-digit industry’s employment in total Manufacturing employment, by year.
Regional Agglomeration Share of regional employment (NUT3) in total employment in the country, by year.
Foreign Presence in Industry Share of FF’s employment in total 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
Industry Opennessb Ratio 2-digit industry (Exports + Imports)/2-digit industry Gross Value Added, by year.
Industry Growth Ln(2-digit industry Employmentt)  Ln(2-digit industry Employmentt1)
Entry Rate Ratio (Entrants’ employment in year t/2-digit industry total employment in year t)
Industry Dummies Dummy = 1 for each 2-digit industry where the ﬁrm operates; 0 otherwise.
a Firm sales in real terms (2005 constant prices).
b Data at 2-digit industry level (ISIC rev. 2) on exports and imports come from Statistics Portugal; Gross Value Added at the industry-level was obtained from Bank of
Portugal.
4 Additional estimations using two year lags for both endogeneous variables
were also performed, though producing qualitatively similar results.
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Table A.II
Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Age (1)
Size (2) 0.21
Firm Performance (3) 0.15 0.02
Human Capital (4) 0.01 0.04 0.17
Foreign Ownership (5) 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.12
Urban (6) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02
MES (7) 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.05
HH Index (8) 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01
Industry Agglomeration (9) 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.60 0.34
Regional Agglomeration (10) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.68 0.17 0.04 0.17
Industry Openness (11) 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.38 0.01
Industry Growth (12) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.08
For. Presence in Industry (13) 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.31 0.07 0.68 0.01
Entry Rate (14) 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.21
Table A.III
The effect of foreign ownership (indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-Owned FF).a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
FF_Minority 0.4496** 0.1392 0.1537 0.1604 0.0390
(0.2091) (0.1420) (0.1403) (0.1428) (0.2025)
FF_Majority 0.3468*** 0.1638* 0.1754* 0.1770* 0.0882
(0.1311) (0.0905) (0.0897) (0.0914) (0.1249)
FF_WhollyOwned 0.4427*** 0.0849 0.0942 0.0957 0.1165
(0.1020) (0.0713) (0.0704) (0.0717) (0.0900)
Downturn9194 0.2377*** 0.2348***
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Downturn0103 0.0917*** 0.0924***
(0.0127) (0.0128)
FF_Minority*Downturn9194 0.5352
(0.3572)
FF_Majority*Downturn9194 0.4535**
(0.1966)
FF_Wholly Own*Downturn9194 0.0982
(0.1876)
FF_Minority*Downturn0103 0.3458
(0.3170)
FF_Majority*Downturn0103 0.2041
(0.2472)
FF_Wholly Own*Downturn0103 0.1450
(0.1614)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145
Log Likelihood 160,540.95 129,280.99 127,491.23 127,393.66 127,387.93
x2 1058.28*** 10,624.49*** 11,334.77*** 10,999.36*** 11,011.17***
su 2.4087 0.4242 0.3577 0.4505 0.4497
r 0.7791 0.0986 0.0722 0.1098 0.1095
x2(r) 317.46*** 35.60*** 18.76*** 38.99*** 38.86***
a Complementary log-logistic model with piece-wise constant hazard rates and Inverse Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity. Models 1–5 correspond to the same
speciﬁcations presented in Table 5, but replacing the variable For.Ownership by the several indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-Owned FF. Accordingly,
Model 1 estimates the effect of foreign ownership, without controlling for any other variables. Model 2 controls for ﬁrm-level differences. Model 3 adds industry-level
variables. Model 4 includes the effect of downturns and Model 5 corresponds to the ﬁnal global speciﬁcation, including all variables.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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